{"id":987,"date":"2020-02-21T18:18:46","date_gmt":"2020-02-21T17:18:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/?p=987"},"modified":"2020-02-21T18:18:46","modified_gmt":"2020-02-21T17:18:46","slug":"trumpist-vs-putinist-geopolitics-in-middle-east-a-poker-vs-a-chess-player","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/trumpist-vs-putinist-geopolitics-in-middle-east-a-poker-vs-a-chess-player\/","title":{"rendered":"Trumpist vs Putinist Geopolitics in Middle-East – A poker vs a chess player: What\u2019s the name of the game and who\u2019s winning?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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\"Snapshot<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

When the Ukrainian crisis\nemerged in early 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea and held a public referendum\nto legitimize the inclusion as an autonomous republic within the Russian\nFederation, all eyes of public opinion were shifted from the ongoing Syrian\ncrisis in Middle East to the Donbass region. Washington, under the Obama\nadministration, together with the European leaders through Brussels, attempted\na unified proclamation by condemning Moscow in intruding in Ukrainian affairs,\ndestabilizing the region and illegally detaching territories from it. Economic\nsanctions and an expulsion of diplomats from both sides shortly followed,\nmaking many scholars and journalist to recall the beginning of a new Cold Era\nbetween the West and the East. Nonetheless, the focal point of actions was soon\nrestored in Middle East in 2016 when Russia decided to intervene militarily in\nSyria aiming to end the conflict and stabilize the region. On the other side,\nthe US underwent a major change in presidential elections, and sought the\ncoming of Trump administration in power. While the conflict in Syria is still\nongoing at the time of writing this paper, the actual equilibrium of forces in\nMiddle East reflects a U-turn of 180\u00b0, and the balance of power seems to have\nelevated all other actors except Pentagon. <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Considering the recent occurred\nevents and the dynamics in play by the actors involved in the Syrian conflict, the\nstudy will attempt to identify new motions that are set into play in the Syrian\ntheater of operations, and what implications do they pose in the near future\nfor the entire regional power dynamics. By taking the latest geopolitical\nsnapshot over the region, this study will attempt to hinder light to some\nrecent questions that have been raised by contemporary scholars and IR\ntheorists. Trying to understand the latest actual geopolitical consequences in\nthe region, the study will perform a link-analysis methodology between various\nevents, actions and declarations by leaders of all countries involved in Syria,\nfollowing realist and constructivist approaches from IR. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the structure of\nthe paper will follow three main patterns in the Syrian theater of operations,\nthat require answers through link-analysis: First, the strengthening of the\ncoalition Iran-Russia-Turkey: under what circumstances and how was the\ncoalition achieved, also who was in pol-position? Second, the decision by the Trump\nadministration to withdraw the American boots on the ground- what is the\nrationale behind such action from Pentagon\u2019 point of view and what effects did\nsuch action trigger in the power dynamics in Middle East? Third, the latest drone\nhigh-rank target killing (or assassination if we follow the International Law\nterminology) of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani- did such bold action really\neliminate a current threat, or did actually create new multiple threats\nfollowing a \u201chydra-effect\u201d in Middle East and probably beyond? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

After analyzing those three main patterns and explaining why were crucial in changing the stage in Syria, the second part of the paper will turn to the main title. Fourth topic will analyze which country seems to have gained most considering its interests vis~a~vis the others? Lastly but not least, following the preceding topic, which leader has demonstrated higher skills and capabilities in elevating their country\u2019s position in the region and in the global context? Having set up the roadmap for this paper, let us now follow it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

I.  The creation of the tripartite coalition Iran-Russia-Turkey: which was the playmaker?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

II. Trump\u2019s Administration decision of withdrawal: is there any rationale behind the retreat, any strategy at all?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

III. The high-rank target-killing of an Iranian General: a US exit-strategy or a scapegoat for returning boots on ground?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

IV. With the current snapshot over the geopolitical power dynamics in Middle East, which country seems in a better position?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

V.  Reflections: The poker vs the chess player- What type of game is in play?<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I.  The creation of the tripartite coalition Iran-Russia-Turkey: which was the playmaker?<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

If we glance back into\nthe start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Syrian civil war was considered\nand viewed simply as a local and internal Syrian conflict. However, when ISIL\n(Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) or Daesh (as the Arabic world refers to, in\norder not to address it either as a state, neither as adhering to Islam considering\nthe mass atrocities, genocide and crimes against humanity that the subjects of\nthis self-proclaimed state have done in the name of religion) started to emerge\nin 2014 after capturing Mosul from Iraqi forces, with the shadow of restoring\nthe former Islamic Caliphate stretching from North Africa to Central Asia, the\nalarm bells started to ring sharply in Washington, Brussels and Moscow. The\nSyrian disease had undergone a mutation, and without an immediate international\nintervention, the entire region of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was\nrisking to be affected by this contagious pandemic virus. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first country to\nreact and intervene was the US, which sought to enforce the Iraqi borders and\nstart an offensive against Daesh. In forming its strategy, the White House\nsought to instrumentalize various insurgent groups in the area which could\nfight against ISIL, like the oppositional forces called Syria\u2019s Democratic\nForces (SDF) which oppose the Ba\u2019ath regime of Assad. However, crucial to this\nstrategy, was the ethnic group of Kurds who reside on both sides of Syrian\nborders, in Iraq and in Turkey.  A few\nmore words are necessary to explain the American relationship with the Kurds,\nbecause the later has become a decisive factor in the outcome of the war, as\nwell as on what will come in the aftermath. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The use of Kurds simply\nas instruments to advance the states agenda, has been utilized by US even\nbefore, and not alone but together with Iran, if we go back in the 1970s. As\nCIA declassified reports confirm, US backed the Kurds in Iraq in 1972-1975 on\ndirect request by the Iranian Shah Pahlavi at the time, and as soon as the\nIraqi government agreed with a favorable solution to Iran, support to the Kurds\nwas cut off and all the Kurds were left in the mercy of the Saddam Hussein\u2019\nregime.[1]<\/a> In fact the Kurds were on\nthe verge of a suitable deal for border autonomy with Baghdad at the time, when\nPentagon advised their leader Mustafa Barzani to refuse the offer, because\notherwise this would not satisfy Teheran, confirming once again that the ethnic\ngroup was simply a \u201cuseful tool for weakening [our ally\u2019s enemy\u2019s] potential\nfor international adventurism.\u201d[2]<\/a> In fact, the US Sec. of\nState at the time, Henry Kissinger, did not even reply to the plea of Barzani\npledging for US humanitarian intervention after withdrawing succor and closing\nboth eyes on the bloody upheaval in power of Saddam Hussein. [3]<\/a> Kissinger is quoted\nsaying: \u201ccovert action should not be confused with missionary work.\u201d[4]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Having explained this\npart of the history, will be helpful to explain later the nowadays\u2019 feeble\nKurdish-American relationship. Furthermore, this untrustworthy relationship\nconsists the Achilles\u2019 heel on how this moment was seized by another leader to\nstuck a new deal, namely Putin.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2015, following the US\nintervention, Kremlin became alarmed that the spread of American influence in\nthe region would be further consolidated by abolishing the Assad regime and\nsupporting the opposition forces, therefore it decided to intervene upon a\nformal request by Assad. Moscow was enough with the \u201cArab Springs\u201d in MENA, and\nwas suspicious that even the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv was another Western\nattempt to pull Ukraine out from the Kremlin orbit. So the Russian operations\nbegan with a massive air support bombarding ISIL positions initially, and then\ntargeted also Syrian governmental opposition militant groups. This continued up\nuntil Nov. 24, 2015 when Turkish F16s under the direct command of Pr. Erdogan\nshoot down a Russian Su-24 close to its aerial territorial borders.[5]<\/a> After this international\nincident, a turning point began in the US coalition. Let\u2019s turn now to the\nTurkish position in the region. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Up to the Su-24 incident,\nTurkey was aligned to US as a NATO member country, and was assisting locally\nthe Sunni Arab oppositional forces only by hitting the Kurdish insurgents close\nto its borders by destroying their bases. It is exactly on this part that Putin\nturns his attention, by approaching more Teheran, and offering more support\ntowards the Kurds, while instructing Assad to promise an autonomous territory\nof Kurdish inhabited areas under the New Federal Syrian Constitution. This was\nabsolutely a direct hit to Ankara. Turkey has been a neutral regional power\nplayer, playing the pacifying role in times of crisis during the Cold War,\nespecially mediating between the Israelis\u2019 and their Arabian foes. In the wake\nof Syrian civil war, Ankara sought to support the Sunni Arab forces which\nresided with the rebels against Assad\u2019s regime, thus joining the US led coalition.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anyways, in the aftermath\nafter the Russian intervention and the emergence of the fight against Daesh,\nAnkara\u2019s main goal immediately was focused in depriving the Kurds, localized\nwithin its territory, to get in accordance and gain position with their Kurdish\ncounterparts in Syria (who, as will be explained in the next topic, were\npromised local autonomy in exchange for their pro-Assad support during the\ncivil war and ending ISIL remnants in the region), as well as create a direct\nbridge for connecting and excessing influence on the Sunni-Arabs.[6]<\/a> Although such goals put\nAnkara in total crash with other NATO partners, Erdogan has always cried out\nabout the partners for not taking Turkey\u2019s interests into account, inherently\nreferring to what stands to be the Turkish nightmare: a total eruption and\nrebellion of Kurdistan in the region, claiming autonomy or even worse, total\nsovereignty from Turkey. Under such fears, Erdogan launched a vast military\noperation codenamed \u201cOlive Branch\u201d during Feb-Mar 2018 against the Syrian Kurds\nbased in the North-Eastern parts of Syria, with many international media\nreporting ethnic cleansing and other human rights violations. The scenario was\nan opportunistic movement by Erdogan, considering that the Kurds in this area\n(Afrin) were part of the SDF forces and were against Assad fighting, thus being\nan ally also of US. Such situation created (again) the first sign of mistrust by\nKurds towards the White House.[7]<\/a> At the same time, the US\nled coalition was showing also the first signs of cracks due to the high costs\nof maintaining an alliance with another member country which considers\ndifferent parties in the conflict as terrorist and existential threat at home\n(the People\u2019s Protection Units, representing the Syrian Kurds which is the\nparallel organization of PKK in Turkey).[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At this end, after the\nplane-incident, Putin evidently seized the moment at his own advantage by\nmoving on to strengthen his bilateral cooperation with Teheran on the fight\nagainst ISIL, and for securing stability and peace in the region. Additionally,\nPutin managed successfully to stuck a deal with Pr. Erdogan for delivering the\nnew S400 Air Defense Missile System in Dec. 2017[9]<\/a>, causing in return a\nfurther split of Turkey with US and NATO in general. In retaliation, US suspended\nthe delivery of F-35 as well as Turkey\u2019s participation in the chain supply production\nof the F-35 program. At this moment, we turn our attention to explain the\nIranian position in the region. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 1979, Iran has been\nallies with Syria in the front for proxy wars against Saudi Arabia and Iraq,\nalthough sharing the same party ideology of Ba\u2019ath at the time. Additionally,\nthrough Damascus, Teheran is able to operate and extend its support further to\nLebanese Shiites and Hezbollah, likewise in Palestine through Hamas to\nundermine Israel influence in the region.[10]<\/a> Iran, being on the other\nspectrum of the Arab world and protector of Shiite Moslems, with the other end\nled by Saudi Arabia for all the Sunnis, has a long history of quarrel and\nfighting for supremacy in the Islam world and influence in MENA. In the proxy\nwars that have been sponsored by S. Arabia and Iran, the latter succeeded in\nimposing a friendly regime in Oman in 1971, when Sultan Qaboos was helped by then\nShah Reza Pahlavi to depose his own father (Sultan Said bin Tamur) who was tied\nmore with Iraq and S. Arabia.[11]<\/a> Sultan Qaboos would rise\nto become one of the most eminent balance holders and honest brokers in the\nregion up today, where in times of crisis every leader from central Asia up to\nAfrica would rely on Oman\u2019 Sultan to ease the tensions and resolve dispute in a\npeaceful way. Nonetheless, the aged Sultan Qaboos has created justified anxiety\nand worry amongst the contemporary leaders of the region regarding his\nsuccessor and if the same neutrality policy will be maintained, and who will be\ncalled to ease tensions in times of crisis.[12]<\/a> Logically, Iran has\nextended its support in favor of Assad\u2019s governmental forces in the Syrian\nconflict, whereas the Wahhabi dynasty in Riyadh followed suit her US ally in\nproviding succor for the rebel forces fighting against Assad. However, the\nIranian strategy in supporting the Shiite Kurds is not to secure for them a\ncomplete independence, as this would enable a Turkish invasion, but rather to\nstabilize them under Damascus with a local considerable autonomy.[13]<\/a> On the other side of the\nfront, the Saudis support to the rebel groups (Assad oppositional forces) continued\nup until another important event occurred in late 2018, explained below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reverse shift in\nSaudi\u2019s FP came with the assassination of Jamal Khashoogi, a Saudi dissident\njournalist with American citizenship contracted by The Washington Post <\/em>in US. The killing occurred on Oct. 2 2018, at\nthe Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Much controversy was spilled around\nthe news at the time, but as the Turkish authorities started to dig deeper unto\nthe case under the special supervision of Pr. Erdogan, in late Sep. 2019, the\nSaudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman publicly accepted the responsibility for\nthe death of Khashoogi \u201cbecause it happened under his watch\u201d. Nonetheless, he\ndenied to have been involved or ordering it, referring to the death squad\n\u201cTigers\u201d composed by 15 Saudi Secret Service agents that were found to be\ninvolved in the murder.[14]<\/a> As investigations were\nongoing, after a direct meeting between Prince Salman with Pr. Trump, the\nAmerican leader rushed to declare his support for the Prince, and despite the\nreports by the UN Human Rights Agency, Turkish authorities as well as the FBI,\nPr. Trump vetoed the resolution already passed in US Congress by both Houses urging\nto end the US military assistance for S. Arabia\u2019s war in Yemen.[15]<\/a> Apparently, Pr. Trump\nbehaved purely as a businessman remaining faithful to his \u201cAmerica\u2019s first\u201d,\nwhen seeking to save Prince Salman was actually seeking a new deal with Riyadh\nand Abu Dhabi for the sale of F-35.[16]<\/a> Nevertheless, after\nKhashoggi\u2019s assassination, as the Turkish investigation were (and still are)\nongoing, S. Arabia began to withdraw its supply-landlines and weaponry support\ntowards the rebels in Syria, enabling Turkish forces an open-battle ground\nagainst the Kurds in the region, likewise to take the Sunni lead in MENA. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"America's<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Thus far, in coordination\nwith Russian and Iranian advisors and forces, Damascus strengthened decisively\nits position and gained almost all the lost territories from ISIL, and\nprogresses likewise in re-taking most of the rebelled towns. Indisputably it\nwas Moscow who seized the moment after an incident which was sought only to\nfreeze the bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey, but apparently had\nmore large profound effects. Was Vladimir Putin who immediately compensated the\nmove, by shifting entirely the FP in Middle East by becoming the playmaker for\nthe new coalition between Russia, Iran and Syria. Before explaining how Turkey\nwas absorbed into this line, first is necessary to jump in the next topic where\nwill be explained the American FP in the region, and the decision of Trump\nAdministration to withdraw its troops in the region.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

II.  Trump\u2019s Administration decision of withdrawal: is there any rationale behind the retreat, any strategy at all?<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

When the Bush\nAdministration decided to enter Iraq in 2003, critics pointed out that there\nwas a lack of strategy on how to get out. The Obama Administration was\ncriticized later in 2014 when for setting the \u201cred line\u201d borders on Assad for\nthe use of chemical weapons and taking no action later[17]<\/a>, weakening thus the\ncredibility of Pentagon in carrying out their threats. In other words, Obama\ninherited a feeble situation in Iraq after Bush won the fighting battle on the\nground but lost the war on democracy and stability on the region. Obama did not\nenter Syria, although was equivocal in Assad\u2019s regime (naming it the Butcher of\nDamascus) to come to an end. However, lacking a clear strategy in stabilizing\nthe region and exiting the country, the White House under the Obama\nAdministration understood that a 2nd<\/sup> Iraq would be another unstable\nbrick in the Middle East puzzle.[18]<\/a> Trump Administration instead,\ninherited from the Obama Administration the ongoing war against ISIL and the\nSyrian conflict, as well as the \u201cWar on Terror\u201d declared by the Bush\nAdministration back in 2001. Anyways, under what circumstances did the Trump\nAdministration decided to withdraw American boots on Syria?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The only answer for\nfinding Trump\u2019s decision, is if we follow the trajectory of events already\ncovered in the first topic. The linear function points out again to the Kurdish\nfactor as the dependable variable inside the Syrian equation. On Oct. 6 2019, after\na direct call-phone with Pr. Erdogan, Donald Trump took [another besides many\nconsidered as] a controversial FP decision to put out the American troops in\nthe North-Eastern parts of Syria, exactly those areas which are inhabited\nmostly by the Kurds. This came as a result because of the Astana Talks since in\nJanuary 2017, initiated by Pr. Putin to forge the new coalition between Russia and\nIran, with the goal of putting an end to the conflict and restore order and\nstability in the entire region, as well as undermine Turkey in retaliation for\nthe downing of Su-24. Analysts at the time, were not sure why Putin was taking\nsuch an active role in this part of the world, entering a new costly adventure\nseemingly endless, only for securing perhaps a naval base in the Mediterranean\nSea (Tartus), was considered a very small gain for such a huge undertaking,\nexcept if he was planning to project further Russian influence in the region.[19]<\/a> Anyways, Trump decided to\nprovide silently \u201cgreen light\u201d to Erdogan, and this decision it\u2019s not by\nsurprise that was regarded by many analysts and scholars as a sacrilegious\nbetrayal towards the Kurds.[20]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other leaders also\ninterpreted that as another sign of weakness by US for playing the world\u2019s\nwatchdog. What followed suit, on Oct. 9th<\/sup> 2019, probably upon\nhearing his advisors\u2019 reports and fears that Turkey would repeat its operation\n\u201cOlive Branch\u201d (in 2018), now codenamed \u201cOperation Peace Spring\u201d, sent the\ninfamous letter which still today is making the rounds around the diplomatic circles\nin the world, regarding the Trumpist style and \u201cdiplomatic courtesy\u201d in\nwriting.[21]<\/a>\nReports came out to be true, as on the same date Erdogan had authorized another\nbombing raid campaign to expel the Kurds further by 30km, aiming to create a\nsecure safe-cordon line. Trump immediately sent Vice-Pr. Pence and Sec. of\nState Pompeo for talks in Ankara. The situation was tense, up to the point when\nRussia choose to harden its position towards Turkey. The vacuum created by US\nretreat, offered ample opportunity for Kremlin to intervene in order to patrol\nthe safe zone, prohibiting further fighting between the SDF Kurdish fighters\n(reminder: Syrian Democratic Forces) and the Turks, and likewise strengthen the\nRussian position as the honest broker between all parties.[22]<\/a> The Kurds\u2019 leaders on the\nother hand, smelling what Marx has said that history tends to repeat itself first as a tragedy and then as a farce<\/em>,\nrushed on their own to sign a deal with the Syrian government and gain their\nprotection as well as that of the Russians.[23]<\/a> The next deal between\nErdogan and Putin was reached in Sochi on 22 Oct.\u201919, for jointly patrolling\nthe 30km safe zone, pushing the Kurds further in south.[24]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The outcome? Facing the\nretreat decision from Trump Administration in Oct\u2019 19 to pull out all American\ntroops except a few, so to guard only oil infrastructure in some Syrian areas,\nseems to have a clear \u201cexit strategy\u201d although it lacks any rationale behind it\ndespite facing criticism for being present only for the sake of the black gold.\nEven the realists cannot answer all questions that arise from such decision:\nwhile realists might defend the defensive role that US is taking in order to\nsave up costs, US soldier\u2019s lives, and fighting for an endless conflict without\na defined strategic objective for Pentagon, the actual retreat has created new\nproblems like the loss in US credibility as an ally, escalating the conflict\ndue to the vacuum created by its missing presence and the power dynamics rising\nfrom that move, by other powers that have stepped in, thus losing its influence\nin the zone in a multiplied rate. [25]<\/a> On the other hand, the\nprice of US paid to maintain its influence apart from investing 5 years of FP\nin the region, was more in dropping supplies to the SDF fighters who have lost\n11.000 lives,[26]<\/a>\ncontrast to 1000 US troops assigned to operate in Syria, working more as\nsupportive and training operatives for the SDF.[27]<\/a> Moreover, realists have\nto consider also the image of White House current administration in the eyes of\nother opportunist leaders who seek to profit in other conflict zones where\nAmerica still has presence and plays the watchdog, like Korean Peninsula, the\nBalkans, the Pacific containing China\u2019s rise and guaranteeing Japan\u2019s interests\netc. Credibility is a powerful factor in conducting foreign policy, particularly\nwhen you are a superpower, and considering nowadays\u2019 world which has been\ntransformed in multipolar centers, where regional powers are fighting for more\ninfluence and prestige, a loss in credibility might encourage regional powers\nto take unprecedented actions that might not satisfy America\u2019s and its allies\u2019\ninterests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

All this has led to a new\nFP nicknamed lately in sarcastic tones as \u201cstrategic ambiguity\u201d.[28]<\/a> Nonetheless, perhaps the\nTrump Administration decided to \u201creshuffle the cards\u201d again with another bold\naction that surprised the world, analyzed briefly in the next topic before\njumping to our second section which will provide answers directly to the titles\nof this paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

III.  The high-rank target-killing of an Iranian General: a US exit-strategy or a scapegoat for returning boots on ground?<\/a>  <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In the morning of Jan. 3,\n2020 the world was awaken with the flash news of the killing of a high-rank\nIranian general. What had occurred was that three missile US drone commanded\nattacked a car escort just outside the perimeter of Baghdadi international\nairport. The primary target was not an ordinary terrorist, by the Commander in\nChief of the Special Quds Force Unit of Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps,\nMajor-General Qassem Soleimani. The creation of the this special unit was\ndesigned since Ayatollah Khomeini came in power, with the purpose to export\nIranian Islamic revolutionary spirit abroad in Middle East, by creating contact\nand support paramilitary groups in clandestine way. And not by coincidence, along\nthe other victims, second VIP was also Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi\nal-Muhandis, commander of the Kataib Hezbollah group financed by Iran, which\nmade the attacks at the US embassy and many other raids led against US troops,\nand for which the US undertook the raids in Dec.\u201919 that in turn generated the\nIraqi to protest and attack the Embassy fortification by the end of Dec.\u201919.\nThird victim was the son in law of Soleimani, who was a member of Lebanese\nHezbollah.[29]<\/a>\nClearly, the strike was a gold shot to US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Soleimani is\nconsidered the 2nd<\/sup> most important and powerful person in Teheran\nafter Khomeini, he was regarded as a destabilizing factor and a threat to\ninternational order according to the White House and its allies, do to his\nclandestine operations with the Quds Force. Washington held him responsible in\nthe words of Trump \u201cdirectly and indirectly for the deaths of millions of\npeople.\u201d While cold-blood policy-makers might understand the necessity of\ntaking such bold action by Pentagon under the plea for protecting US, on the\nother hand there is huge debate over the nature of this target-killing. Being\nnot a non-state actor, but a high political figure of another state, is normal\nthat Teheran FM furiously attacked US for committing an act of terrorism. This questions\nthe drone-targeting program for blurring the lines and non-distinguishing\nbetween non-official combatants that are not subject of the Geneva Convention,\nand the official ones.[30]<\/a> While there is huge\ntension in the time of writing and fears for escalations to a direct open\nconflict, after Iran declared that it would avenge its commanders\nassassination, the question raised here is why at this moment the Trump administration\nordered such a bold action? What are the implications that follow after?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The assassination or\nkilling (depends how one wants to frame it following either the political\nnature or the lawfulness of the order), although was a surprise move by the White\nHouse, was already somehow expected. Earlier, Trumps threatened Teheran by\naccusing it openly for orchestrating the attacks at the US Embassy in Baghdad\nat the end of Dec.\u201919.[31]<\/a>  Notwithstanding, in many occasions Trump\ndeclared that he would pull US troops out from the region, in contrary by Jan.1st<\/sup>\n2020 he ordered the deployment of an additional 750 troops in Middle East to be\nadded to the 14,000 US troops already operating in the Gulf region since May\u2019\n19.[32]<\/a> Hence, instead of pulling\nout, the White House actually decided to send even more troops in.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another important factor\nto consider is the connection of Gen. Soleimani in the power-dynamics of the\nregion. Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani was under US surveillance since 2011 in\nSyria, leading advisory board to the Syrian Army for repressing the protests,\nthen playing a prominent role also in Iraq in organizing the US opposing\nforces. The White House had gathered intel and had designated Soleimani as the\nmastermind behind Iran\u2019s strategy in Syria.[33]<\/a> Moreover, the General had\nvisited Moscow in 2015 to meet and discuss with Russian officials a possible\njoint intervention in Syria. This trip concluded the suspicions of the White\nHouse that Soleimani had become the mastermind of Iran\u2019s strategy in the whole MENA.[34]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Apparently Soleimani was\noutmaneuvering the White House in the proxy-wars around the Middle East theater\nof operations. A brilliant tactician and a fierce strategist in taking actions\nand calculating every move before and after, the Iranian General clearly was\nthe main shield for expanding the Shiite influence across Iranian borders, from\nIraq up to Syria and Lebanon. Seemingly, if the White House is having troubles\nwith one Putin on the other side of the Atlantic, now imagine if a 2nd<\/sup>\nsatellite of Putin demonstrating the same mindset, would come in power in the\ncenter of Middle East and Asia, substituting Khomeini after his death. However,\nUS critics\u2019 arguments against the Trump Administration should also be taken\ninto account. Some scholars and domestic political opponents, definitely\nbacklashed the White House by reminding Trump the same accusation that he\naddressed to Obama back in 2011, for opening a war against Iran to be\nre-elected.[35]<\/a>\nThere is no need for much comment here, as history has proven on several\noccasions the point that leaders, to remain in power, do not hesitate to create\nconflicts abroad in order to rally support at home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

IV.    With\nthe current snapshot over the geopolitical power dynamics in Middle East, which\ncountry seems in a better position?<\/a> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

After the long-analysis\ncovered by the first section, where we looked unto three important phases that\nhave changed the entire theater of operations in Middle East, now we turn to\nbriefly explain what has been gained by each major participating power. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, Syria definitely\nis in a better position, considering that ISIL has been almost completely\ndestroyed, the rest of the war is against Assad\u2019s oppositional forces. In that\nposition, Assad has survived to stay in power, thanks to the crucial help\nreceived by Putin. With the Russian intervention the tide of war turned in\nAssad\u2019s favor, and having also the back up of Iran, has rallied the assistance\nof all Syrian Kurds who have done most of the fighting in eliminating the ISIL\nwarriors. Assad, upon mediation of Putin and instructions from Teheran, managed\nto stuck a deal with the Kurds, although this has created panic on Ankara. Nonetheless,\nDamascus has strengthened its position inside the country and the governments\u2019\nforces have retaken the major cities and Assad\u2019s former strongholds. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Assad<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Turkey, starting with\n2015 plane crash, began a U-turn in its FP in Middle East, closing up more with\nthe Russian led coalition with Iran. The main reason reside again the Kurdish\nfactor. While the Turkish partners in NATO, US, actively backed up the Kurds,\nthis displeased Ankara in many occasions. The moment came when Erdogan was\nconvinced to ease tensions also with Putin after the Su-24 shoot out, and was\npersuaded to buy the S400 air defense missile system by Russia. This caused the\nloss of F35 deal with US, pushing Ankara into future possible deal with Russia\nfor the purchase of Su-35 aircrafts.[36]<\/a> The Turkish situation is\nvery ambivalent, as Erdogan has launched two operations that have fought\ndirectly the Kurds in Syria. The last deal with US meant nothing as the 30km\nsafe zone was already imposed, whereas the deal with the Russians to jointly\npatrol the area actually re-confirms that Ankara is manifesting more trust\ntowards Moscow as the key playmaker in the region, and less on Washington that\nis ever since declaring to withdraw. The Kurdish card however remains a lethal\ncard in the hands of Moscow. Nonetheless, Erdogan, having total monopoly in\nunveiling the truth of Khashoggi\u2019s assassination through the investigations,\nconstantly reminds the Saudi Prince Salman that his fate is tied to his will.\nTurkey definitely seems to have elevated its own position in the Islamic World,\nsubstituting S. Arabia at the moment as the focal point for all the Sunni\nadherents.    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Iran on the other hand,\nhas displayed high cunning skills and maturity in its FP, consistently\nundermining Washington\u2019s game in the region through covert operations and\ndirect support to its satellite groups. In Syria, Teheran supports the Shiite\nKurds within the SDF, and has been keen to reach the ultimate deal in\ncoordination with Moscow too, in convincing the Kurdish forces to join Assad\u2019s\ngovernmental forces. Although this support towards Assad and other groups\nfighting against US led coalition has put more tensions between Teheran and\nWashington, the former seems to have currently gained the upper hand in the\nbattle of legitimacy in international media. With the zig-zags of Trumps\u2019 FP\nand the direct order of striking an Iranian official with target-killing, Iran\nhad a pledge against US right now to avenge their general. Many other\ncountries, including Russia, Lebanon, Syria etc. have condemned the killing by\nframing it as a direct political assassination, making US to be appear no less\nthan in equal terms like ISIL. Nonetheless, the latest news of the shooting of\nBoeing Flight 752 in the vicinity of Teheran, has damaged the image of Iran.\nFirst, Iran denied and claimed that the crash was due to plane\u2019s mechanical\nerrors, but after further investigation and US intel broke out, Teheran\nadmitted openly that was a human error in the Iranian Tor missile defense\nsystem (bought from Russia) who decided to launch the missile after the plane\nwas appearing as a cruise missile in the software\u2019s system, and the operator\nwas jammed.[37]<\/a>\nMore is expected to come up from the investigations, especially as this incident\ncomes minutes after Teheran launched a battery of warning missiles aimed at\nclose proximity of Iraqi military bases that were housing US troops, as\nretaliation for the killing of Gen. Soleimani.[38]<\/a> It looks like an\nastonishing coincidence that this tragedy occurred in the middle of the high\ntensions between Teheran and Washington, right after the protests in Baghdad,\nthe target-killing of Gen. Soleimani, and the promise for a retaliatory\nresponse by Teheran. This tragedy has definitely tied the hands of Teheran for\nthe moment, endeavoring to justify this human error and apologizing towards\nUkraine and Canada (most of the passengers were citizens of those countries). Nevertheless,\none can see some Faustian fortune within this misfortune, a tragedy in minor\nproportions, avoiding or at least postponing a greater one that might be in\nbiblical proportions.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Kurds, after facing\nthe first stab behind their backs by Turkey, and the second by the Trump\nAdministration for taking no action at all besides solely plain words and\nthreats towards Erdogan, managed lately to sign a deal with Assad, under the\numbrella of Moscow and Teheran. Reminding the betrayal by the Nixon\nAdministration in the 70s, the Kurds are aware that no one could be trusted,\nincluding the Russians, which for the sake of keeping the Turks within their\norbit, might give up the Kurdish card at any moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia has come out\ndefinitely in a better elevated position. By deciding to intervene in Syria in\n2015, it shifted the major attention of the world for criticizing its conflict\nin Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea. Putin used the Kurds after the 2015\nplane shoot-down by Turks, by declaring Russia\u2019s support to them and an autonomy\nin a post-war federal state of Syria, inspiring fear to Erdogan and making him\nto rethink his strategy by publicly apologizing officially for the shooting of\nthe Russian plane in June 2016.[39]<\/a> After the apology, Turkey\nlaunched immediately \u201cEuphrates Shield\u201d operation and entered North of Syria,\nwhereas Russia closed both eyes and ears from its previous statements towards\nthe Kurds. Additionally, dragging behind the Trump Administration to change\n180\u00b0 US FP from throwing Assad regime towards keeping him in power and hold the\nground, Moscow somehow managed to besmirch also Washington with the blood\nspilled by the \u201cbutcher of Damascus\u201d, pushing away the criticism sustained so\nfar solely for its succor to him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lastly but not least, the\nUS under the Trump Administration has caused great uncertainties in the region\nwith its ambivalent FP. Its strategic goals have turned towards a defensive\nstance, in cutting down the costs of maintaining its engagement in the region.\nHowever, those goals seem more on the tactical level in the theater of Middle\nEast operations. The consequences are more far reaching in terms of broad\nstrategic implications in FP, considering the loss in integrity for US FP,\ncredibility towards keeping the allegiance towards their allies. The major win\nfor the White House under the Trump Administration, it\u2019s regarding the ability\nfor pulling Russia into the conflict, creating an immersive costly undertaking\nby the Russians, together with the Iranians to operate and provide support for\ntheir interest groups in the conflict. Again, those are short-term tactical\ngoals that can be overrun in the end by US opponents that might have clear long\nterm strategic objectives in the area. As for Washington, considering its\nzig-zag oscillations in pulling in and out troops, shows a clear sign that\nPentagon under the current administration has no clear long term strategic\ngoals in MENA. Trump attempted to use the Kurdish card against Erdogan after the\nNATO split deal with F-35 after the S400 deal with the Russians by Ankara,\npushing the latter into a future potential deal for Su-35 with Moscow. However,\nthe Kurds were not fooled this time, rushing to forge a good deal with the\nSyrians and Russians to be protected by both Ankara\u2019s surgical strikes, and\nWashington\u2019s silence. Trump definitely chose to withdraw from Syria, in order\nto satisfy Erdogan by leaving free-hand to step-in the Kurdish territories. All\nthose movements reinforce the claim that Erdogan\u2019s nightmare is a united\nKurdish front. The problem with US hit and run tactics, is that is estranging\nalso existing friends or allies, like Iraq or Israel. Although the\nassassination of Gen. Suleimani might have left satisfied only Jerusalem, again\nthe retreat policy of US, leaving Assad under the influence of Teheran and\nMoscow, has made Netanyahu to approach Moscow and lean towards Putin Putin\nseems a more trusted mediator in relation to Teheran\u2019s support for various\nmilitant groups that are designated as terrorist organizations by Israel, like\nHezbollah and Hamas. Perhaps even for domestic political gains, Netanyahu\nsought once again to threaten by annexing parts of West Bank territories where\nPalestinians live, but surprisingly he was invited by Putin to discuss the\nmatters in Sochi in Sept.\u2019 19[40]<\/a>, not by Trump, showing\nclearly that the Russians hold the upper hand in the power dynamics of the\nregion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

V.   Reflections: The poker vs the chess player- What type of game is in play?<\/a>  <\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In terms of geopolitics,\nwhen a leader and the team of advisors look at the map, they will always have\nto think in terms of grand strategy and various tactics as instruments for setting\nin motion the strategy to realize the objectives unfolded in the table. Thus,\nif one would like to compare geopolitics with a type of board-game, there are\nalways two the most eminent and often declared: poker and chess. However, if\none looks closely at the level of the game, if one thinks on strategies, poker\ndoes not offer many options to the player except the element of surprise,\npressure and patience for the strike moment, as the rest is dependable entirely\non luck by the cards. Yet, those are all only one time usable, as your opponent\nhas the ability to learn and trace back your actions in a future scenario by\npreparing a defensive ground. Chess on the other hand, offers a multitude of\nscenarios in the field and various options for the same movement. Moreover, it\nenables the player to think in terms of tactics and strategies by having a plan\nB, C and more for each move by trying to outmaneuver the opponent by calculating\nsuch movements in advance. The more calculations, the better the ability to foresee\nand make a rational well-weighted decision. So in conclusion, geopolitics\ndefinitely resembles more the chessboard, while on the tactical level of the\ntheater of operations, poker can be useful only in short-term tactics. Having found\nthe name of the game, we finally come to the last part of this paper, seeking\nto answer the second title of this study, and name who is the poker vs the\nchess-player. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Trump started his\npresidential campaign with the ultimate goal of pulling out America from a fight\nthat does not belong to, the reality is that US is still there. Moreover, the\noscillations that the Trump Administration have been following in the region do\nnot actually even deserve to be compared with poker, but rather pure bowling. In\nthe beginning, Trump isolated US from other NATO allies as he called for more\nresponsibility within the alliance to share the financial burdens, thus making\nseveral countries shaggy in expressing a unified voice in major FP issues.\nWhile he might be right to ask for sharing the financial burden of maintaining\nNATO alive, the moment that he chose was incorrect. Next, with one shoot, Trump\nattempted to leave all pins in the ground for the other players in two\noccasions. First, by declaring a total withdraw from Syria, which ultimately\nfailed due to the Kurdish factor which gave a blow to US credibility, the\nmoment was seized to fill the vacuum by another player (Putin\/Russia). Second,\nthe target-killing of a high official working for another government (Gen.\nSoleimani), has caused more insecurity in the region, thus requiring even more\nUS troops to fortify the ground in Iraq (changing once again in U-turn the US FP\nfrom exiting into entering deeply to the region). Likewise, more insecure is\nalso the overall position in Middle East, due to the multiple threats that\nmight emerge by Iran\u2019s proxy fighting groups. It appears that Trump has already\nuncovered all his cards, and Erdogan has been accustomed with the threats from\nPentagon, giving signs of indecisiveness from the White House, and showing a\ntotal lack of strategic goals in American FP in Middle East besides the\nexit-option. What will the North-Korean leader interpret such moves? Above all,\nwhat will the Russian Premier interpret? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Erdogan showed that\nhe understands the name of the game, his chess skills definitely seem to be far\nlower from the Russian counterpart. Turkey gained a bit by securing its\nsouthern borders from what considers a \u201cKurdish threat\u201d, and definitely rising\nin prominence after controlling the investigation of the Khashoggi case,\nreplacing S. Arabia as leader of the Sunni Muslims. Teheran likewise has shown\nhigh maneuverability in the Middle East chessboard, but recently lost the queen\nfigure, which was the mastermind for holding the US into a defensive stance. Lastly,\na wrong movement (downing of the Ukrainian plane), has weakened further the\nIranian defense position and the lowered the possibility for another attack to\navenge their Queen. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other side, the\nRussian President has demonstrated a clear strategic-vision for stabilizing the\nMiddle East and increase the Russian influence in the zone. Above all, Moscow\nsuccessfully shifted the international media attention from Ukraine in Middle\nEast, pushing further the prying eyes from its apocryphal approach towards its\nneighbor. The following tactics seem to serve such purpose.Firstly, by deflecting\nTurkey from the Western camp was a major score, while keeping Iran on the table\nand easing tensions with Shiite, promulgated a round-table of cohesive\ndiscussions over constructing a secure and stabilize future for Syria.\nSecondly, finalized the coalition bringing Turkey with the initiative in Astana\nimmediately after the American election that brought Trump into the White\nHouse. Putin was the first to threaten, and later offer to Erdogan a deal over\nwhat appears to be Turkey\u2019s nightmare: a unified Kurdistan. Thirdly, Putin\nrushed to sign a deal of Kurdish controlled forces under Assad\u2019s government,\nand intervene to jointly patrol with Turkish forces the 30km safe-zone after\nclosing an eye on Turkish rapid advancement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this logic, the\nKurdish factor turns out to be three-fold positive outcome for Kremlin. First a\nfavor to Erdogan for leaving him to secure the safe-zone and satisfy his Turkish\nhardline critics in Ankara. Second, another blow to NATO allies who continue to\nsupport the Kurds while Turkey will put national interests first above all.\nThirdly, by further dividing the costs of the Syrian campaign with another\nregional power (Turkey) besides Iran, outmaneuvering Trumps\u2019 earliest major\nachievement for dragging Russia into the conflict, while compelling the US to\nswitch in supporting the \u201cbutcher of Damascus\u201d as referred by the preceding\nWhite House Administration. Lastly but not least, Putin secured an exit in the\nMediterranean Sea by securing the port of Tartus, and through the rise in\nposition and influence in the region, expand the market by boosting up Russian military\ncomplex industry sales.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, the rest of\nthe West is showing a deep flaw by missing a unified voice in the conflict. The\nEU, though attempted a mediatory role[41]<\/a>, has no boots to send on\nground as it lacks entirely an army, thus focusing only in offering merely soft\nconciliatory power.[42]<\/a> Such role strengthens\ntheir critics\u2019 voice for being simply an economic union rather a supranational\nentity of state, lacking any hardcore measures except economic sanctions to be\nplayed in those parts of the world. To sum up, Putin definitely knew the name\nof the game since the beginning when decided to enter the conflict.\nUnfortunately, for the Western idealists believing in democracy and human\nrights, he absolutely remains up until now the chess-master in the Middle East\ntheater. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"The<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a>\nDiamond, Gregory A. \u201cThe Unexpurgated Pike Report- of the House Select\nCommittee on Intelligence, 1976\u201d (McGraw-Hill: 1992): 136-142. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a>\nIbid: 139. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a>\nIbid: 140-43. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a>\nIbid: 141. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a>\nGaleotti, Mark. \u201cWhy did it take Turkey just 17s to shoot down Russian jet?\u201d The Guardian <\/em>(Nov. 26, 2015). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a>\nAlavi, Seyed Ali. \u201cWho is the winner in post-ISIS Syria?\u201d Open Democracy, North Africa-West Asia Op-Ed <\/em>(Oct. 17, 2019): 3-4.  <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7]<\/a>\nStein, Aaron. \u201cOperation Olive Branch: Status update,\u201d Atlantic Council <\/em>(Mar. 13, 2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8]<\/a>\nKose, Talha. \u201cTurkey\u2019s Operation Olive Branch,\u201d SETA<\/em> (Nov. 11, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9]<\/a>\nWemer, David A. \u201cAfter Russian air defense deal, can Ankara and Washington\nrepair their relationship?\u201d The Atlantic\nCouncil <\/em>(Jul. 15, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10]<\/a>\nFulton, Will et al. \u201cIranian Strategy in Syria,\u201d A joint report by the American Enterprise Institute &\nInstitute for the Study of War <\/em>(May, 2013). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11]<\/a> Phillips,\nWendell. Unknown Oman<\/em> (David McKay Co., Inc. New York, 1966):\np. 19. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12]<\/a>\nBodetti, Austin. \u201cOman strives for neutrality in the Middle East,\u201d YaleGlobal Online <\/em>(Jan. 7, 2020). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13]<\/a>\nVan Wilgenburg, Wladimir. \u201cIran wants Syrian Kurds to depend on Damascus:\nExperts,\u201d Kurdistan24 <\/em>(Dec. 31,\n2018). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14]<\/a>\nSakelaris, Nicholas. \u201cSaudi Prince bin Salman accepts responsibility but not\nblame for Khashoggi death,\u201d UPI News <\/em>(Sept.\n26, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15]<\/a>\nKirkpatrick, David D. & Cumming-Bruce, Nick. \u201cSaudis called Khashoggi\n\u2018Sacrificial Animal\u2019 as they waited to kill him,\u201d The New York Times <\/em>(June 19, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16]<\/a>\nKheel, Rebecca. \u201cOvernight Defense: House votes to block Trump arms sales to\nSaudis, setting up likely veto,\u201d the Hill\n<\/em>(July 17, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17]<\/a>\nGoldberg, Jeffrey. \u201cThe Obama Doctrine,\u201d The\nAtlantic <\/em>(April, 2016). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18]<\/a>\nPiotr, Pietrzak. \u201cThe U.S. Foreign Policy towards Syria under the Donald Trump\nAdministration,\u201d Academia (<\/em>Research\nGate Net: 2016): 2. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[19]<\/a>\nRutland, Peter. \u201cTrump, Putin, and the Future of US-Russian Relations\u201d, Slavic Review<\/em> Vol 76 (S1) (Cambridge\nUniv. Press, Aug. 1, 2017): 42-43. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[20]<\/a>\nFriedman, Uri. \u201cWhat America\u2019s Allies really think about Trump\u2019s Syria\nDecision,\u201d The Atlantic <\/em>(Nov. 14,\n2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[21]<\/a>\nWard, Alex. \u201cDon\u2019t be a tough guy. Don\u2019t be a fool!\u201d: Read Trump\u2019s wild letter\nto Turkey\u2019s Erdogan,\u201d Vox <\/em>(Oct. 16,\n2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[22]<\/a>\nHubbard, Ben et al. \u201cIn Syria, Russia is pleased to fill an American Void,\u201d The New York Times <\/em>(upt. Oct. 17, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[23]<\/a>\nAbdi, Mazloum. \u201cIf we have to choose between compromise and genocide, we will\nchoose our people,\u201d Foreign Policy <\/em>(Oct.\n13, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[24]<\/a>\n\u201cMemorandum of Understanding between Turkey and Russia on northern Syria,\u201d The Defense Post <\/em>(Oct. 22, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[25]<\/a>\nFeaver, Peter & Inboden, Will. \u201cThe realists are wrong about Syria,\u201d Foreign Policy <\/em>(Nov. 4, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[26]<\/a> Borger, Julian. \u201cTrump and Syria:\nthe worst week for US foreign policy since the Iraq invasion?\u201d The Guardian <\/em>(Oct. 14, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[27]<\/a>\nFeaver, Peter & Inboden, Will. \u201cThe realists are wrong about Syria,\u201d Foreign Policy <\/em>(Nov. 4, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[28]<\/a> Brown, Frances Z. \u201cWhy Trump\u2019s\nshapeshifting Syria policy worked- Until it didn\u2019t. The limits of Strategic\nAmbiguity,\u201d Foreign Affairs <\/em>(Nov. 13,\n2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[29]<\/a>\n\u201cQasem Soleimani: US kills top Iranian general in Baghdad air strike,\u201d BBC News <\/em>(Jan. 3, 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[30]<\/a>\nTenreiro, Daniel. \u201cThe Killing of Soleimani was not an \u2018assassination\u2019,\u201d National Review <\/em>(Jan. 10, 2020). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[31]<\/a>\nGearan, Anne; Rucker, Philip and Dawsey, Josh. \u201cTrumps threatens Iran after\nembassy attack, but remains reluctant to get more involved in region.\u201d The Washington Post <\/em>(Dec. 31, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[32]<\/a>\n\u201cUS deploys 750 troops to Middle East after Baghdad embassy attack.\u201d Aljazeera News <\/em>(Jan. 1, 2020).                                  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[33]<\/a>\nFulton, Will; Holliday, Joseph and Wyer, Sam. \u201cIranian Strategy in Syria,\u201d A\njoint report by the American Enterprise\nInstitute & Institute for the Study of War <\/em>(May, 2013): 10-11. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[34]<\/a> Melamedov, Grigory. \u201cRussia\u2019s\nentrenchment in Syria-Moscow\u2019s Middle East Resurgence.\u201d Middle East Quarterly <\/em>(Winter, 2018): Moving the goal posts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[35]<\/a>\nManagan, Dan. \u201cYears before killing Qassem Soleimani, Trump warned Obama would\nstart a war with Iran to get reelected,\u201d CNBC\n<\/em>(Jan. 3, 2020). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[36]<\/a>\nRoblin, Sebastien. \u201cTurkey threatens to buy Russian Su-35 jets if it can\u2019t get\nF-35 stealth fighters,\u201d National Interest\n<\/em>(Nov. 9, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[37]<\/a>\nFassihi, Farnaz et al. \u201cUkraine plane shot down because of human error, Iran\nsays: Live updates,\u201d The New York Times <\/em>(Jan.\n11, 2020). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[38]<\/a>\nSmith, Patrick et al. \u201cIran denies it fired a missile to down Ukrainian jet,\ncalls for evidence,\u201d NBC News <\/em>(Jan.\n10, 2020). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[39]<\/a> Melamedov, Grigory. \u201cRussia\u2019s\nentrenchment in Syria-Moscow\u2019s Middle East Resurgence.\u201d Middle East Quarterly <\/em>(Winter, 2018): \u201cwar inside the war.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[40]<\/a>\n\u201cNetanyahu, Putin to meet as Russia condemns annexation plans,\u201d Aljazeera <\/em>(Sept. 12, 2019).  <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[41]<\/a>\nWildangel, Rene. \u201cClumsy but useful? The German defense minister\u2019s initiative\nfor northern Syria,\u201d European Council on\nForeign Relations <\/em>(Oct. 29, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[42]<\/a>\n\u201cRemarks by the h High Rep.\/Vice-Pr. Federica Mogherini at the Ministerial\nMeeting of the UN Groups of Friends of Mediation,\u201d European Union External Action <\/em>(Sept. 26, 2019). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/a> <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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  2. Alavi, Seyed Ali. \u201cWho is the\nwinner in post-ISIS Syria?\u201d Open Democracy,\nNorth Africa-West Asia Op-Ed <\/em>(Oct. 17, 2019). Accessed on Dec. 05, 2019: https:\/\/eprints.soas.ac.uk\/31734\/1\/Who%20is%20the%20winner%20in%20post-ISIS%20Syria_%20_%20openDemocracy.pdf<\/a><\/em><\/li>
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  13. Galeotti, Mark. \u201cWhy did it take\nTurkey just 17s to shoot down Russian jet?\u201d The\nGuardian <\/em>(Nov. 26, 2015). https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2015\/nov\/26\/russia-turkey-jet-mark-galeotti<\/a><\/li>
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  15. Gearan, Anne; Rucker, Philip and\nDawsey, Josh. \u201cTrumps threatens Iran after embassy attack, but remains\nreluctant to get more involved in region.\u201d The\nWashington Post <\/em>(Dec. 31, 2019). https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/politics\/trump-issues-warning-to-iran-after-embassy-attack-but-remains-reluctant-to-get-more-involved-in-region\/2019\/12\/31\/1704cf72-2be5-11ea-bcd4-24597950008f_story.html#comments-wrapper<\/a><\/li>
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  20. Kose, Talha. \u201cTurkey\u2019s Operation\nOlive Branch,\u201d SETA<\/em> (Nov. 11, 2019).\nAccessed on Dec. 17, 2019: https:\/\/www.setav.org\/en\/us-support-for-ypg-based-on-incorrect-assumptions\/<\/a><\/li>
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  24. \u201cNetanyahu, Putin to meet as Russia\ncondemns annexation plans,\u201d Aljazeera <\/em>(Sept.\n12, 2019).  <\/em>Accessed on Dec. 29, 2019: https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2019\/09\/netanyahu-putin-meet-russia-condemns-annexation-plan-190912063850064.html<\/a><\/li>
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    \n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

    <\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    A snapshot over the current Dec 2019-Jan 2020 geopolitical situation in the Syrian conflict. The study analyzes the balance of power of the main actors involved in the conflict. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":998,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[222,209,211,204],"tags":[221,208,210],"class_list":["post-987","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analiza-2","category-gjeopolitike-2","category-histori-2","category-politike","tag-analiza","tag-gjeopolitike","tag-histori"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/987","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=987"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/987\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/998"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=987"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=987"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/patrioti.al\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=987"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}